Media Trials in India: How Trial by Media Affects the Right to a Fair Trial

Media trials in India: what they are and why they matter

A “media trial” is the process by which newspapers, television channels and social media treat a person as guilty, or as innocent, before a court has decided. In its judgment on coverage of an actor’s death, the Bombay High Court listed the kinds of reporting that call for restraint while a case is pending: pronouncing on guilt, predicting the course of an investigation, interviewing victims or witnesses, analysing what witnesses may say, publishing alleged confessions made to the police, printing photographs of an accused that facilitate identification, and recreating the crime scene.^{[1, 2]}

Two constitutional values are in tension. Article 19(1)(a) protects freedom of speech and expression, including the freedom of the press, but Article 19(2) permits reasonable restrictions on grounds that include contempt of court and incitement to an offence.^[3] Article 21 protects life and personal liberty, and the Supreme Court has treated the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial as protected under it.^{[4, 5]} The law’s task is not to pick one value over the other but to reconcile them.

A note on the current law. This article states the position under the new criminal laws. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was replaced by the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), and the Indian Penal Code by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), both from 1 July 2024. Provisions that older commentary cites as Section 327 CrPC (open court) and Section 228A IPC (disclosure of a victim’s identity) now appear as Section 366 BNSS and Section 72 BNS.^{[6, 7]}

A short history of trial by media

Concern about prejudicial publicity is old. In the treason trial of Aaron Burr in 1807, Chief Justice Marshall had to decide whether prospective jurors who had formed and expressed opinions on Burr’s guilt after widespread press coverage could sit, and held that a person who has deliberately formed and delivered such an opinion is disqualified. Burr was acquitted on 1 September 1807.^[8]

In India, the 1959 trial of Commander K.M. Nanavati in Bombay is a frequently cited early example. Press coverage is reported to have been sympathetic to the accused.^[9] A jury returned a verdict of not guilty by a majority of 8 to 1; the Sessions Judge, taking the view that no reasonable body of men could have reached that verdict, referred the case to the Bombay High Court under Section 307 of the old Code, which set the verdict aside and convicted him; and the Supreme Court upheld the conviction in November 1961 (reported at AIR 1962 SC 605).^[10] Criminal trials in India are no longer decided by juries: the BNSS contains no provision for them, and trials are decided by judges.^[6]

The 1999 killing of Jessica Lal is a later example. The trial court acquitted the accused in 2006, the Delhi High Court convicted Manu Sharma in December 2006, and the Supreme Court upheld the conviction in 2010, addressing the role of the media in its judgment.^[11] Television, 24-hour news and social media have since made coverage faster and harder to contain, and the courts have had to adapt.

How media trials can affect the right to a fair trial

Because Indian criminal trials are decided by judges and not juries, the risk plays out differently from the jury-selection problem familiar from American case law. Courts identify several ways in which coverage can harm a fair trial.

The investigation. In Manu Sharma, the Supreme Court warned of a serious risk of prejudice from unregulated coverage, for example where a suspect’s photograph is published before an identification parade or an accused is declared guilty before any court has ruled.^[11]

Witnesses. Coverage that interviews witnesses or victims, or analyses what witnesses may say, risks influencing or pressuring them, which is why the Bombay High Court listed those practices among the conduct that calls for restraint.^{[1, 2]}

The presumption of innocence. The Supreme Court has said that the presumption of innocence “should not be destroyed at the very threshold through the process of media trial”, particularly while an investigation is pending.^[11]

Judges. The Supreme Court recognised that judges, like anyone, can be subconsciously influenced by outside forces, but in Manu Sharma it found that the coverage had affected the accused only to a very limited extent and had not amounted to prejudice.^[11] The courts therefore do not presume that coverage prejudices a trial; they ask whether there is a real and substantial risk of it.^[5]

Privacy and reputation. The right to privacy is part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21,^[12] and the Supreme Court has held that the press may publish matters from public records but that the State cannot impose a prior restraint on a publication.^[13] An accused who is later acquitted can carry the stigma of coverage long afterwards, and victims’ identities are protected by statute, as discussed below.

Reporting is not a finding. The Hathras case shows that what is alleged in public debate and what a court finds are separate matters. On 2 March 2023, the special court convicted one accused of culpable homicide not amounting to murder and under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and acquitted the other three; it did not convict any accused of rape or murder, and the victim’s family said it would take the fight further.^{[14, 15]} We have not found a reported outcome of any appeal.

Contempt of Court and trial by media

Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines “criminal contempt” as the publication of any matter, or the doing of any other act, that scandalises or lowers the authority of any court; prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner.^[16]

Section 3 limits that liability. A person is not guilty of contempt for publishing matter that interferes with a pending proceeding if, at the time, they had no reasonable grounds to believe it was pending, and publication about a proceeding that is not pending is not contempt. For a criminal case, a proceeding is “pending” from the filing of the charge-sheet or challan, or from the date the court issues summons or a warrant against the accused, until it is finally decided.^[17]

In Nilesh Navlakha v. Union of India (18 January 2021), a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court considered petitions complaining of coverage of an actor’s death. It held that trial by media can obstruct the administration of justice under Section 2(c)(iii), a residual limb that can reach conduct before judicial proceedings formally begin, and it declined to read down Section 3. It also held that reporting on a pending investigation falls within the Programme Code under the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995, and rejected the argument that voluntary self-regulation by broadcasters was enough.^{[1, 2]}

The Court framed its directions as situations that call for restraint, not as a ban on reporting crime.^[2]

Postponement orders: Sahara India Real Estate Corp. v. SEBI (2012)

A Constitution Bench of five judges, headed by Chief Justice S.H. Kapadia, held on 11 September 2012 that the superior courts can order the postponement of a publication or broadcast where that is necessary to protect a fair trial.^[5] The power is preventive, not punitive, and the Court attached strict conditions to it.

There must be a real and substantial risk of prejudice to the fairness of the trial, not a remote or speculative one. The court must apply the principles of necessity and proportionality and ask whether reasonable alternatives, such as a change of venue or postponing the trial, would remove the risk. The order must be of limited duration and must not disturb the content of the publication. The Court treated such orders as reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2), and grounded the power in Article 21 and in the inherent powers of the Supreme Court and High Courts as courts of record.^[5]

The Court did not frame general guidelines for reporting. It held that guidelines on reporting cannot be framed across the board and that each application depends on its facts.^[5] That is why, in practice, relief against prejudicial coverage is sought case by case.

Open courts, victim identity and privacy

Open court. Section 366 BNSS provides that a court trying an offence is an open court to which the public generally has access, though the presiding Judge or Magistrate may exclude the public. The inquiry into and trial of rape, and of specified sexual offences under the BNS and the POCSO Act, must be held in camera. For those trials it is unlawful to print or publish any matter relating to the proceedings without the court’s previous permission, although the ban in a rape trial may be lifted while keeping the names and addresses of the parties confidential.^[6]

Victim identity. Section 72 BNS punishes anyone who prints or publishes the name, or any matter that may make known the identity, of a person against whom specified sexual offences are alleged or found to have been committed, with imprisonment of up to two years and fine. Publication is permitted only by or under the written order of the police officer investigating, in good faith and for the investigation; with the victim’s written authorisation; or, where the victim is dead, a child or of unsound mind, with the next of kin’s written authorisation, which may not be given to anyone other than the chairman or secretary of a recognised welfare institution or organisation.^[7]

In Nipun Saxena v. Union of India (11 December 2018), the Supreme Court read the bar widely. It covers not just the name but any facts that can lead to the victim being identified; copies of the FIR in a rape case are not to be placed in the public domain; judgments should refer to the “victim” and not the name; and the media may report such crimes without naming the victim.^[18]

Children. Section 23 of the POCSO Act bars a media report or comment on a child made without complete and authentic information, where it may lower the child’s reputation or infringe the child’s privacy. It also bars disclosing the child’s identity, including name, address, photograph, family details, school or neighbourhood, unless the Special Court permits it, for reasons recorded in writing, in the child’s interest. Contravention carries imprisonment of six months to one year, or fine, or both. The publisher or owner is jointly liable with employees, and the Meghalaya High Court has held that news agencies and their personnel can be prosecuted.^{[19, 20]}

Who regulates the press and broadcasters?

The Press Council of India (PCI) issues Norms of Journalistic Conduct, but in the Navlakha proceedings the PCI told the High Court that electronic media, television channels and social media are outside its jurisdiction under the Press Council Act.^[1] Television channels are instead bound by the Programme Code under Section 5 of the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995 and Rule 6 of the Cable Television Networks Rules, 1994, which the High Court held applies to reporting on a pending investigation.^[2]

Industry self-regulation exists, but the Court noted that membership of the broadcasters’ bodies is voluntary and that they lack statutory backing, and directed the statutory authorities to act on complaints received.^[2] The practical result is that print, television and digital media are held to different standards, a gap that matters most for online coverage.

Police briefings: the Supreme Court’s 2023 and 2026 directions

Much prejudicial material originates in what investigators tell the press. On 13 September 2023, in People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. State of Maharashtra, a Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India, D.Y. Chandrachud, directed the Ministry of Home Affairs to prepare a comprehensive manual on police media briefings in criminal cases, to prevent media trials. The Court said that police disclosures should be objective and should not have a bearing on the guilt of the accused.^[21]

In January 2026, a Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and N. Kotiswar Singh asked the States to devise an appropriate policy on police media briefings after considering the manual prepared by the amicus curiae, Senior Advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan, and directed that the manual be uploaded to the Court’s website. The States were to act within three months of receiving the order, a period that has since passed; we have not found a report on which States have framed policies.^{[22, 23]}

The Law Commission’s 200th Report (2006)

The Law Commission of India examined the subject on its own initiative and submitted its 200th Report, “Trial by Media: Free Speech vs. Fair Trial under Criminal Procedure”, on 31 August 2006 under Chairman Justice M. Jagannadha Rao.^[24] It recommended that a criminal proceeding be treated as pending from the time of arrest for the purposes of Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, so that prejudicial publication is restricted earlier, and that the High Courts be empowered to order the postponement of publication or telecast in criminal cases.^[24]

Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as it now stands, still ties the pendency of a criminal proceeding to the charge-sheet or summons stage.^[17]

Two cases that are often misdescribed

R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court (2009). The case arose from the BMW hit-and-run trial. A television channel’s sting operation recorded advocates apparently trying to influence a witness, and the High Court found two advocates guilty of criminal contempt. The Supreme Court (Aftab Alam, G.S. Singhvi and B.N. Agrawal JJ.) dismissed R.K. Anand’s appeal against his conviction, subject to a notice on enhancing the punishment, and set aside the conviction of the other advocate, I.U. Khan. It observed that any wrongdoing by the channel in telecasting the recordings was a matter between the Court and the channel, and said that, for all its faults, the sting and its telecast had rendered a valuable service to the cause of protecting the purity of the course of justice. It is a case about advocates interfering with a trial, not a ruling that media trials are contempt.^[25]

Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat (2004, 2006). The Best Bakery case concerned witnesses who turned hostile and a flawed investigation and prosecution. In 2004, the Supreme Court set aside the acquittals and ordered a retrial outside Gujarat.^[26] In 2006, in contempt proceedings against Zahira Habibullah Sheikh herself, it described a fair trial as “a trial before an impartial Judge, a fair prosecutor and atmosphere of judicial calm”. The two judgments are authority on fair trial and witness protection, not on media trials: the 2006 judgment mentions press statements only as background to the facts.^[27]

Challenges and the way forward

The challenges. Digital platforms spread coverage faster than any court order can follow. Print, television and online media are held to different standards. Contempt law is triggered late, at the charge-sheet stage, although much prejudice arises during the investigation. And any remedy must avoid becoming a tool for suppressing legitimate reporting.

A measured response. In our view, the approach that best fits the Supreme Court’s decisions is targeted rather than sweeping: narrow, time-limited postponement orders where a real risk is shown, in preference to blanket gag orders;^[5] disciplined police briefings;^{[21, 22]} consistent standards across print, broadcast and digital media, as the Law Commission’s recommendations and the Navlakha judgment suggest;^{[24, 1]} and training for newsrooms on victim identity and the limits of court reporting.

Practical points for people affected by media coverage of a case

Accused persons and their families. Keep a record of the coverage. Where there is a real and substantial risk to the fairness of a trial, a postponement order can be sought from the Supreme Court or a High Court; the court will consider alternatives and will limit the order in time.^[5] For television coverage, complaints can be made to the statutory authorities under the Programme Code.^[2]

Victims and their families. The law prohibits publication of a victim’s identity in sexual-offence cases and of a child’s identity under the POCSO Act. If identifying material is published, take legal advice about a complaint to the police or an application to the court.^{[7, 19]}

Journalists and editors. Report facts and official statements rather than conclusions about guilt, do not publish matter that can identify a victim, and keep within the Programme Code and the court’s directions in pending cases.^[1]

For related guidance, see our articles on quashing an FIR under Section 528 BNSS, anticipatory bail under the BNSS, the shift from the IPC to the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, and the limits of free speech under Section 152 BNS. This article is general information, not legal advice; our criminal defence practice is described on our practice-areas page.

Frequently asked questions

Is a media trial illegal in India? There is no offence called “media trial”. But coverage can amount to criminal contempt, breach the Programme Code for television, or violate laws that protect victims’ identity, and a court can order publication postponed where there is a real and substantial risk to a fair trial.

Can the media be punished for contempt for reporting on a pending case? Yes, if the publication prejudices or interferes with the due course of a judicial proceeding or obstructs the administration of justice. Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act protects innocent publication and publication about a proceeding that is not pending.

Can the media publish the name of a rape victim? No. Section 72 BNS punishes publishing the name or any matter that may make the victim’s identity known, subject to narrow written exceptions.

Do Indian courts use juries? No. Criminal trials in India are decided by judges, and the BNSS contains no provision for juries.

What is a postponement order? An order of a superior court that postpones a particular publication or broadcast for a limited time, to protect a fair trial, made under the test laid down in Sahara India Real Estate Corp. v. SEBI.

Conclusion

A free press and a fair trial both serve justice, and Indian law does not ask the courts to sacrifice one for the other. It gives them tools: contempt of court, the Programme Code, laws that protect victims, postponement orders, and now a push for disciplined police briefings. Used with restraint and proportionality, these protect the presumption of innocence without silencing legitimate reporting.

The gaps are in timing, in the uneven regulation of digital media and in how consistently the existing rules are applied. Until those are addressed, the decisions in Sahara, Manu Sharma and Navlakha remain the best guide to where responsible coverage ends and prejudice begins.